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The Hon. Bruce Atkinson MLC The Hon. Christine Fyffe MP 
President Speaker 
Legislative Council Legislative Assembly 
Parliament House Parliament House 
Melbourne Melbourne 
 
 
Dear Presiding Officers 
 
Under the provisions of section 16AB of the Audit Act 1994, I transmit my report on the 
audit Heatwave Management: Reducing the Risk to Public Health.  
The audit examined whether the Department of Health’s heatwave framework has 
been effective in reducing the impact of extreme heat on public health. In particular, the 
audit assessed whether agencies are well prepared to respond to heatwaves and have 
effectively applied the heatwave framework. 
While the framework has contributed to reducing the impact of extreme heat on public 
health, I found several shortcomings that need to be addressed if Victoria is to be 
adequately prepared for—and able to respond to—prolonged heatwaves. In particular, 
there needs to be greater clarity around the roles and responsibilities for the 
management of heatwaves and better public messaging. I have made eight 
recommendations which, if implemented, will strengthen Victoria’s capacity to prepare 
for and respond to prolonged heatwaves. 
 
Yours faithfully 
 
John Doyle 
Auditor-General 
14 October 2014 
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Auditor-General’s comments 
Heatwaves have contributed to more deaths than any other natural disaster in 
Australia. In Victoria, the number of 'excess deaths' from the 2009 heatwave was 
much greater than the number of deaths arising from the Black Saturday bushfires 
the following week.  
It is expected that the duration and severity of heatwaves will increase. Victoria’s 
ageing population and the growing incidence of chronic disease, makes our 
community increasingly vulnerable to the impact of prolonged heatwaves. Despite 
this, the community continues to underestimate the impact of extreme heat on their 
health.  
The audit examined whether the Department of Health’s heatwave framework, 
which is consistent with international better practice, has been effective in reducing 
the impact of extreme heat on public health. I found that while implementation of 
the framework and the collective efforts of all agencies contributed to reducing the 
impact of extreme heat in the 2014 heatwave, there are several key shortcomings 
that need to be addressed.   
There needs to be greater clarity around roles and responsibilities in the 
management of heatwaves. Currently governance arrangements are unclear—
although Victoria Police is the identified control agency for the response to 
heatwaves, there is a lack of clear and effective leadership to provide a coordinated 
multi-agency approach to the state’s management of heatwaves. The lack of clear 
understanding and definition of a heatwave has contributed to this. 
While Victoria has a state-level emergency plan for tsunamis, it does not have a 
state-level plan for heatwaves, despite heatwaves being identified as one of the 
state’s significant emergency management risks. Individual agency heatwave plans 
are not mandatory, their quality is variable, and there is lack of clarity around the 
triggers for activation of the plans. There is also inadequate assurance as to their 
quality.  
While the Department of Health issued targeted messages to vulnerable groups in 
the community during the 2014 heatwave, better messaging and public education 
are needed to increase broader public understanding of the impact that extreme 
heat can have, and of the ways in which this impact can be managed. Assisting 
individuals to take more responsibility for the health and wellbeing of themselves 
and others in the community would help reduce pressure on emergency services, 
particularly Ambulance Victoria, during heatwaves.  
John Doyle 
Auditor-General 
Audit team 
Michele Lonsdale 
Engagement Leader 
Melinda Gambrell 
Team Leader 
Aina Anisimova 
Analyst 
Jason Cullen 
Analyst 
Engagement Quality 
Control Reviewer 
Ray Winn 
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There are insufficient assurance mechanisms in place to be confident that public 
health services are well prepared to manage the risk of critical infrastructure failure, 
such as air conditioning and emergency generators, during a heatwave. This is a 
serious risk given that hospitals care for the state’s most vulnerable people, 
including those susceptible to extreme heat. 
As we head into the 2014–15 summer season, these issues need to be addressed 
urgently and proactively if Victoria is to be better prepared to respond to heatwaves 
and adverse impacts on public health are to be minimised. 
The report contains eight recommendations which, if implemented, will help 
improve the state’s preparedness for and capacity to respond to heatwaves. 
I intend to revisit the issues identified in this report to ensure they are being 
appropriately addressed. 
I want to thank the staff in the Department of Health, Department of Human 
Services, Department of Justice, Ambulance Victoria, Victoria Police, the three 
audited health services and three audited councils who assisted with this audit and 
for their constructive engagement with the audit team throughout the audit. 
 
John Doyle 
Auditor-General 
October 2014 
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Audit summary 
Heatwaves pose a significant risk to public health. Heat-related illness can range from 
mild conditions, such as a rash or cramps, through to heat exhaustion, and finally to 
potentially fatal conditions such as heat stroke.  
In the past five years, Victoria has endured two heatwaves that have contributed to 
significant loss of life. The Department of Health (the department) has estimated that 
during the 2009 heatwave there were 374 excess deaths—this is more than the 
number of deaths attributed to the Black Saturday bushfires the following week. A 
further 167 excess deaths occurred during the 2014 heatwave.  
The Bureau of Meteorology states that the duration, frequency and intensity of 
heatwaves in Australia have increased since 1950. Heatwaves have become more 
prevalent in the past 20 years across the south-eastern states of Australia. 
Heatwaves are expected to become more frequent in Victoria. Based on current 
trends, the Victorian Government's 2014 Emergency Risks in Victoria – Report of the 
2012–13 State Emergency Risk Assessment estimated that the average annual 
number of days above 35°C in Melbourne is likely to increase from nine days in 2014 
to 11–13 days in 2030 and 15–26 days by 2070. 
Since the 2009 heatwave, the department has developed a heatwave framework to 
reduce the impact of extreme heat on public health. The framework includes the 
Heatwave Plan for Victoria, the Heatwave Planning Guide for municipal councils, the 
Heat Health Alert System, the Heat Health Information Surveillance System and 
communication resources. 
The objective of this audit was to determine whether applying the department's 
heatwave framework has been effective in reducing the impact of extreme heat on 
public health. 
Conclusions 
While there was a reduction in the estimated number of excess deaths associated with 
the impact of extreme heat on health during the 2014 heatwave, the department is not 
able to clearly attribute this outcome to the implementation of its framework. However, 
in 2009 there was no heatwave framework in place. It is likely that the framework and 
collective efforts of all agencies have contributed to the reduced impact on public 
health in 2014. 
The heatwave framework is soundly based. It includes many of the elements accepted 
by leading international health and meteorological organisations as being essential to 
respond to the potentially significant health risks associated with heatwaves.   
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However, there are a number of critical gaps that were identified in the 2009 heatwave 
debrief that continue to be raised as issues—such as the need for clear roles and 
responsibilities, sufficient strategic monitoring, greater clarity around triggers for 
activation and sharing of data across multiple systems.  
The Heatwave Plan for Victoria is not a state-level plan. While Victoria has a State 
Tsunami Emergency Plan and a State Earthquake Emergency Plan, there is no 
equivalent state-level plan for heatwaves, despite the recognised significant risk 
heatwaves present to the state and to the community.  
Governance arrangements for heatwaves are not clear despite this being raised as an 
issue in the 2009 heatwave debrief. There is a lack of clarity over who is leading the 
response to heatwaves. While Victoria Police is the assigned control agency, it is not 
always recognised by others as the leader of heatwave emergency response and in 
2014 did not assume or consistently apply its assigned responsibility across regions.  
This means that no agency is making sure all support agencies have activated their 
heatwave plans or that resources are being directed to where they are needed most, 
or monitoring the effectiveness of those arrangements. As a consequence, the state's 
response to heatwaves is being managed at an operational rather than a strategic 
level.  
There is no mandatory requirement for agencies to have a heatwave plan. Victoria 
Police, as the control agency for the response to heatwaves, is still finalising its 
operational guidelines for heatwaves with the intention of releasing these in time for 
the 2014–15 fire danger period. While each of the councils and health services we 
audited had a plan, the effectiveness of the heatwave framework is compromised 
because it is being applied selectively by agencies. There are significant gaps in 
quality control and quality assurance over state and local emergency management 
planning.  
While there was a noticeable increase in the amount of public health messaging in the 
2014 heatwave, messages about the potentially significant health risks associated with 
extreme heat, and the ways in which community members can prepare for and respond 
to heatwaves, are not being disseminated effectively to the broader population. This 
means community members are not being adequately prepared for heatwaves.    
Findings 
Governance arrangements are not clear 
Roles and responsibilities for responding to and managing heatwave incidents are not 
clear or well understood by agencies. Victoria Police's role as control agency for the 
response to heatwaves was intended to be an interim arrangement, however, this 
arrangement has not been reviewed. There is currently a lack of clear and effective 
leadership to provide an integrated, multi-agency approach to the state's management 
of heatwaves. 
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Monitoring and reporting arrangements are not adequate given the significant risks 
associated with a heatwave emergency. For example, State Control Centre daily briefs 
show that most of the information reported as the 2014 heatwave progressed was on 
preparedness for the consequential impact of fire. There was no equivalent mapping or 
analysis of the extreme heat impacts across the community.  
While all audited agencies had incident management systems, these did not fully 
capture key decisions made during the event.  
Quality of planning for heatwaves is variable 
There is no mandatory requirement for agencies to have a heatwave plan and there 
are no clearly articulated minimum requirements to guide development of state-level 
plans. The Heatwave Plan for Victoria is an operational plan, not a recognised 
state-level incident plan for heatwaves. Despite being the control agency for the 
response to heatwaves, Victoria Police is still finalising its operational guidelines in 
time for the 2014–15 fire danger period. While municipal councils may develop 
heatwave plans as sub-plans of their municipal emergency management plan, the 
currency and quality of these plans is not monitored or reviewed.  
Sufficient and appropriate resources are not always available across all agencies to 
respond to heatwaves. Reduced staffing over the summer months affected some 
agencies' ability to respond effectively during both the 2009 and 2014 heatwaves. 
While health services were able to manage demand, the audited councils needed to 
recall staff from holidays to make contact with vulnerable people. During the 2014 
heatwave, the Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority—the Triple Zero 
emergency call-taker—responded to the highest number of calls for ambulance 
services ever recorded. However, Ambulance Victoria needed to bring in additional 
resources to respond to demand.   
Health services care for some of the state's most vulnerable people, who are 
particularly susceptible to extreme heat. For health services, a significant risk during a 
heatwave is failure of critical infrastructure and the performance of emergency 
generators. Recognising this risk, the department provides $25 million annually as part 
of the Engineering Infrastructure Program. However, there is no assurance that health 
services are prepared for the risk of critical infrastructure failure.  
While training and emergency incident exercises are regularly provided, extreme heat 
and its impact on resources, infrastructure and the community, has not yet been 
adequately tested in the form of an emergency exercise. A more proactive approach to 
heatwave preparedness is needed which includes a prolonged heatwave scenario. 
Public health messages are not always well targeted 
The Heat Health Alert System (HHAS) is soundly based and accords with best practice 
internationally. However, the HHAS objective of notifying stakeholders of forecast 
heatwave conditions that are likely to have an impact on public health is not 
consistently and effectively achieved.  
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Public health messages do not fully meet community needs. For example, heat health 
alerts are not well understood and do not target the whole community. Although there 
was increased media focus on heatwaves in 2014, they do not receive the same level 
of media attention as other extreme weather events in relation to the impact on health 
and ways of minimising this impact. 
While heat health messages are targeted at the most vulnerable, they need to be 
underpinned by education and awareness-raising activities to encourage community 
members to take responsibility for each other in order to reduce reliance on 
government or agency intervention.  
Audited agencies found the department’s communications resources suitable, although 
they acknowledged they could improve how well they distribute the department’s 
information in the community. 
Heatwave plans activation is not well understood 
During the 2014 heatwave, the department monitored the activation of heatwave plans 
by health services and councils, establishing whether health services had an 
alternative power source and had checked its operation. While these measures are 
appropriate to the risk, they are not usual practice or reflected in the department's plan. 
Activation is not well understood by agencies and is applied inconsistently. The 
department's HHAS does not follow the Victorian Warning Protocol to issue warnings 
in a phased approach. Activation of heatwave plans in municipal councils can mean 
anything from sending out a summer newsletter or forwarding a heat health alert, to 
establishing an incident control centre.  
A department survey of councils in late January 2014 during a second spike in extreme 
heat—after the mid-January heatwave—identified inconsistent application of basic 
elements of sound heatwave management, as well as examples of good practice. 
However, there is no systematic dissemination of this good practice to inform future 
planning and drive improvement.  
Recommendations  
Number Recommendation Page 
That Emergency Management Victoria: 
1. working with appropriate agencies, clarifies the control and other 
roles and responsibilities for heatwave arrangements 
21 
2. facilitates the development and implementation of coordinated 
whole-of-government heatwave arrangements 
32 
3. facilitates the development of guidelines, including appropriate 
minimum standards for content in state-level sub-plans of the State 
Emergency Response Plan 
32 
4. in developing the new emergency management planning legislation, 
clarifies the role of municipal councils and includes a quality 
assurance mechanism for municipal emergency management 
planning. 
32 
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Recommendations – continued 
Number Recommendation Page 
That the Department of Health: 
5. assures itself that public health services are well prepared to 
manage the risk of critical infrastructure failure during a 
heatwave 
32 
6. develops a communication strategy for heatwaves that includes 
public awareness and education activities 
46 
7. implements a phased approach to heat health alert warning 
categories in line with the Victorian Warning Protocol 
46 
8. reviews the purpose and effectiveness of the Heat Health 
Information Surveillance System during a heatwave. 
46 
Submissions and comments received 
In addition to progressive engagement during the course of the audit, in accordance 
with section 16(3) of the Audit Act 1994 a copy of this report, or relevant extracts from 
the report, was provided to the Department of Health, the Department of Human 
Services, the Department of Justice—which includes Emergency Management 
Victoria— Ambulance Victoria, Victoria Police and the three audited councils and three 
audited health services with a request for submissions or comments. 
Agency views have been considered in reaching our audit conclusions and are 
represented to the extent relevant and warranted in preparing this report. Their full 
section 16(3) submissions and comments are included in Appendix A. 
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1 Background 
1.1 Introduction 
Heatwaves represent a significant risk to public health. In Victoria, the number of 
'excess deaths' from the 2009 heatwave was much greater than the number of deaths 
arising from the Black Saturday bushfires the following week. Not only is the risk 
significant, but the likelihood and duration of heatwaves is expected to increase, while 
an ageing population with greater levels of chronic disease will make Victorians more 
vulnerable to the impact of these events.  
Despite the gravity of this scenario, the potentially devastating impact of extreme heat 
on individuals and services is frequently underestimated by the community. 
 Impact of heatwaves 1.1.1
Heat-related illness occurs when the body is unable to adequately cool itself, ranging 
from mild conditions such as a rash or cramps, through to heat exhaustion, and finally 
to very serious and potentially fatal conditions such as heat stroke. Extreme heat 
events can also exacerbate pre-existing conditions, with the risk of heat-related 
mortality (death) and morbidity (disease, illness) increasing for people with illnesses—
including cardiovascular disease, diabetes and cancer. The aged, infirm and isolated, 
young children, nursing mothers, and people on certain medications are all vulnerable. 
An additional area of concern is occupational heat stroke, particularly for outdoor 
workers and indoor workers with limited access to cooling systems. 
In the past five years, Victoria has endured two heatwaves that have resulted in 
significant loss of life. Figure 1A shows that there were three days of extreme heat—
mean above 30ºC temperatures—in Melbourne at the end of January 2009 and four 
days in mid-January 2014.  
  Figure 1A
Daily temperatures during extreme heat events in Melbourne, 2009 and 2014 
2009 Max Min Mean 2014 Max Min Mean 
26 Jan 25.5 14.4 21.1 12 Jan 22.8 16.5 19.0 
27 Jan 36.4 16.6 27.6 13 Jan 31.1 15.2 24.7 
28 Jan 43.4 18.8 34.6 14 Jan 42.8 18.2 35.7 
29 Jan 44.3 25.7 35.0 15 Jan 41.7 28.6 34.4 
30 Jan 45.1 25.7 33.8 16 Jan 43.9 27.0 34.8 
31 Jan 30.5 22.5 25.4 17 Jan 43.9 25.6 32.7 
1 Feb 33.8 20.3 27.3 18 Jan  24.0 21.4 20.1 
Source: Victorian Auditor General's Office, using Bureau of Meteorology Melbourne regional 
office weather station data. 
Background 
2        Heatwave Management: Reducing the Risk to Public Health Victorian Auditor-General’s Report 
January 2009 heatwave 
In 2009, the heatwave was of unprecedented intensity and duration with maximum 
temperatures 12–15°Celsius (qC) above normal for much of Victoria, while Melbourne 
endured three consecutive days of temperatures above 43°C. There were 374 excess 
deaths during the heatwave—a 62 per cent increase in mortality compared to what is 
normally expected at that time of the year. The greatest number of excess deaths 
occurred in those 75 years or older, while deaths in those 65 years and older more 
than doubled compared with the same period in 2008.  
January 2014 heatwave 
In 2014, Melbourne experienced temperatures in excess of 41°C each day between 
14 and 17 January inclusive. Parts of the state experienced temperatures of 45°C or 
more on three consecutive days during this period. 
In 2014, there were 167 excess deaths during the heatwave. This heatwave was 
similar in intensity and duration to the 2009 heatwave. Although the maximum 
temperatures for the 2014 heatwave were slightly lower than those in 2009, the mean 
temperatures in January 2014 were higher and lasted longer than the temperatures 
experienced in 2009. 
Comparison between the two heatwaves 
In 2009, a heatwave was not yet formally recognised as an emergency in Victoria and 
there was no heatwave framework in place. Data available through the Heat Health 
Information Surveillance System shows a significant reduction in ‘excess deaths’ 
between the 2009 and 2014 heatwaves. Health services, the After Hours doctor 
service and the Coroner all experienced spikes on the day after the final day of the 
heatwave in both 2009 and 2014.  
Figure 1B shows some of the impacts on public health and services during the two 
heatwaves.  
  Figure 1B
Impact on public health and services ̾ 2009 and 2014 heatwaves 
Nature of impact 
2009 (26 January  
to 1 February) 
2014  
(12–18 January) 
Excess deaths(a) 374 167 
Heat-related emergency 
department presentations 
714 621 
After Hours doctor 
consultations 
1 955 3 687 
Ambulance dispatches 
(metropolitan Melbourne) 
7 035 8 359 
(a) Excess deaths are the number of deaths over what would normally be expected for the same 
period. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office, using Department of Health information. 
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Figure 1C shows some additional evidence of the severity of the impact on public 
health and services during the 2014 heatwave. 
  Figure 1C
Further 2014 heatwave impacts  
On 17 January 2014: 
x the Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority (ESTA) experienced the highest 
number of calls ever received for ambulance services—2 553 calls 
x there were 90 Priority 0—immediate life threat—callouts in metropolitan Melbourne, 
which is 210 per cent more than expected. 
Between 12–18 January 2014: 
x 224 people arrived at a hospital emergency department requiring immediate 
resuscitation 
x 40 per cent of heat-related emergency department presentations were for people aged 
75 years and over. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office, using Department of Health information. 
Dehydration was the most common heat related condition at public hospital emergency 
departments during both heatwaves, followed by heat stroke and heat syncope—
fainting due to extreme heat. Figure 1D shows the heat related emergency department 
presentations by patient condition. 
  Figure 1D
Heat-related emergency department presentations, by condition 
  
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office, using Department of Health information. 
The 2014 heatwave created a new record in the highest number of calls for ambulance 
services ever received in a day. On Thursday 16 January a new record was set, which 
was eclipsed the following day, Friday 17 January. 
One of the most serious consequences from heatwave conditions is cardiac arrest. 
Ambulance Victoria responds to these incidents as a Priority 0 callout.  
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During the 2014 heatwave, there was an average of 49 Priority 0 callouts per day for 
metropolitan Melbourne, and during the 2009 heatwave there was an average of 25 
Priority 0 callouts per day for metropolitan Melbourne. 
1.2 What is a heatwave? 
There is no single accepted definition for a heatwave because similar temperatures 
can have different impacts on communities at different times.  
The 2011 Heatwave Plan for Victoria – Protecting health and reducing harm from 
heatwaves, defines a heatwave as ‘a period of abnormally and uncomfortably hot 
weather that could impact on human health, community infrastructure and services’.  
In 2013–14, as part of a heatwave forecast product trial, the Bureau of Meteorology 
developed a national definition of a heatwave—‘three days or more of high maximum 
and minimum temperatures that is unusual for that location’. 
Using findings from research undertaken by Monash University, the Department of 
Health (the department) has applied a technical definition of heatwave based on the 
minimum temperature threshold that is likely to impact on the health of a community 
and at which heat-related service activity increases. This is known as the heat health 
temperature threshold. At the threshold level, there is an increased risk of morbidity 
and mortality from heatwave conditions.  
The department uses the Heat Health Alert System to monitor temperature using 
Bureau of Meteorology forecast information. This system was developed to notify 
agencies—such as local government, departmental units, hospitals and community 
service providers—of forecast temperatures likely to have an impact on public health.  
 The heat health temperature threshold 1.2.1
Three heat health temperature thresholds apply in Victoria, ranging from 30qC in the 
south of the state, 32qC across the centre of the state, to 34qC in the north-west of the 
state. This is based on the research by Monash University that was used to develop 
the heat health threshold temperatures and reflects the varying levels of resilience to 
extreme heat across the state. For example, residents of Mildura in the north-west of 
the state have a higher level of resilience to extreme heat than residents in Geelong, 
therefore, the heat health temperature threshold for Mildura is 34qC, whereas Geelong 
has a threshold of 30qC. 
The heat health threshold temperature is based on the average, or mean, temperature 
using the forecast day maximum and the forecast overnight temperature for the 
following day. For example, if Melbourne was forecast to have a maximum day 
temperature of 40qC, the forecast overnight temperature would need to be 20qC to 
trigger the heat health temperature threshold of 30qC. If Mildura was forecast to have a 
maximum day temperature of 40qC, the forecast overnight temperature would need to 
be 28qC to trigger the heat health temperature threshold of 34qC. Figure 1E shows the 
heat health temperature thresholds and corresponding weather forecast districts.  
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  Figure 1E
Heat health temperature threshold and weather forecast districts 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office from the Department of Health’s Heatwave Plan for 
Victoria – Protecting health and reducing harm from heatwaves, 2011 
1.3 The heatwave framework 
At the time of the 2009 heatwave, there was no heatwave framework in place. 
In 2006, the government recognised that community and local government are the 
most appropriate levels for heatwave emergency planning and responses, and 
committed to the development of a Victorian heatwave emergency plan. As a result, 
the Department of Human Services developed the 2007 Victorian Heatwave Strategy, 
which provided the foundation for the subsequent 2009–10 heatwave framework.  
The heatwave framework aims to reduce the impact of extreme health on public health 
and comprises the: 
x Heatwave Plan for Victoria – Protecting health and reducing harm from 
heatwaves (2011)—to coordinate an integrated response to heatwaves 
x Heatwave Planning Guide – Development of heatwave plans in local 
councils in Victoria (2009)—to assist municipal council heatwave planning 
x Heat Health Alert System—to monitor climate conditions and alert stakeholders 
when the heat health threshold temperature is forecast to be met or exceeded 
x Heat Health Information Surveillance System—to monitor and assess the 
human health impact of heatwaves 
x communication resources—includes posters, brochures and information 
sheets.  
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1.4 Victoria’s emergency management 
arrangements 
Two significant external reviews of Victoria's emergency management arrangements in 
the past five years—the Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission and the Victorian Flood 
Review—have informed subsequent reforms to emergency management structures 
and arrangements. 
In 2011, the Victorian Government released a Green Paper, Towards a More Disaster 
Resilient and Safer Victoria, which challenged Victoria's existing approach to crisis and 
emergency management arrangements. In 2012, a White Paper, Victorian Emergency 
Management Reform, paved the way for changes to the legislative framework 
governing emergency management. These developments are likely to result in further 
changes as the new legislation and associated governance arrangements are 
embedded. 
 Governance arrangements 1.4.1
The new Emergency Management Act 2013 came into effect on 1 July 2014 and, in 
conjunction with the earlier Emergency Management Act 1986, provides the legislative 
framework for the organisation of emergency management in Victoria. The objectives 
of the new legislation are to foster a sustainable and efficient emergency management 
system, establish efficient governance arrangements, and implement an ‘all hazards—
all agencies’ approach based on networked arrangements and greater interoperability. 
The new Act focuses on community, collaboration and capability. It establishes the: 
x State Crisis and Resilience Council—the peak crisis  and emergency 
management advisory body in Victoria 
x Emergency Management Victoria (EMV)—the agency responsible for 
coordinating the development of whole-of-government policy for emergency 
management and implementing emergency management reform initiatives.  
Emergency management governance arrangements are shown in Figure 1F. 
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  Figure 1F
Emergency management governance arrangements 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
The new legislation supports the appointment of the:  
x Chief Executive of Emergency Management Victoria—to provide advice and 
make recommendations on any issues relating to the functions of EMV, and to 
take a lead role in coordinating investment planning and large scale strategic 
projects on behalf of responding agencies.  
x Emergency Management Commissioner—to coordinate the activities of 
responding agencies, ensure control arrangements are in place during an 
emergency and for consequence management for a major emergency.  
x Inspector-General for Emergency Management—to provide assurance to 
government and the community on emergency management arrangements and 
to foster continuous improvement of emergency management in Victoria.  
 Planning arrangements 1.4.2
The Emergency Management Manual Victoria (EMMV) contains the policy and 
planning documents for emergency management. It includes emergency risk 
management and mitigation, the State Emergency Response Plan (SERP), municipal 
emergency planning arrangements and emergency management agency roles.  
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Figure 1G shows the relevant planning outputs from the 1986 and 2013 legislation, 
which are discussed below. 
  Figure 1G
Legislative framework – emergency management planning 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
State Emergency Response Plan  
SERP identifies the organisational arrangements for managing the response to 
emergencies within—or with the potential to affect—Victoria. It identifies three key 
emergency management tasks of control, command and coordination: 
x control is the overall direction of response activities in an emergency 
x command is the direction of personnel and resources of an agency in the 
performance of that organisation’s role and tasks 
x coordination is the bringing together of agencies and resources to ensure 
effective response to and recovery from emergencies.  
Municipal emergency management plans 
The responsibilities of municipal councils are outlined in the Emergency Management 
Act 1986. Part six of EMMV operationalises these responsibilities, which include the 
requirement for councils to prepare and maintain a municipal emergency management 
plan (MEMP), to appoint a planning committee, and for the plan to be audited every 
three years by the Victoria State Emergency Service. Through the MEMP process, 
councils are required to identify key emergency risks—such as flood, pandemic and 
heatwave—and where appropriate, to develop sub-plans to specifically address these 
risks.  
As part of the Victorian Heatwave Strategy 2007, the Department of Human Services 
funded a pilot project in 2008 to develop municipal council heatwave plans. The pilot 
informed the development of the Heatwave Planning Guide – Development of 
heatwave plans in local councils in Victoria, which was released in July 2009, several 
months after the 2009 heatwave. 
State Emergency 
Response Plan
Municipal Emergency 
Management Plan
State Health 
Emergency 
Response Plan
Emergency Management 
Act 1986
Emergency Management 
Act 2013
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Councils are also required under the Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 to develop 
municipal public health plans. Councils may develop municipal heatwave plans as a 
sub-plan to their MEMP, or as part of a municipal public health and wellbeing plan or in 
their municipal council strategic plan. 
State Health Emergency Response Plan 
The State Health Emergency Response Plan (SHERP) is the Victorian health 
response plan for emergency incidents and is a sub-plan of the SERP. The SHERP 
outlines the arrangements for coordinating the health response to emergency incidents 
that go beyond day-to-day business arrangements. It is an 'all-hazards', scalable plan 
and includes arrangements for regional and state health responses. It provides the 
framework for planning the health response to emergency incidents such as heatwave.  
 Roles and responsibilities 1.4.3
Part seven of the EMMV specifies agencies' roles in planning for, responding to, and 
recovering from an emergency. It specifies that Victoria Police is the control agency for 
the response to heatwave, and that other agencies, including the Department of 
Health, have a support role. A control agency leads the response to a particular type of 
emergency. Support agencies provide resources, such as personnel, essential 
services and materials, to support or assist a control agency or affected person.  
Figure 1H shows the control and support agencies for the response to heatwaves. 
  Figure 1H
Agencies with a role in responding to heatwaves 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
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1.5 Audit objectives and scope 
The objective of this audit was to determine whether applying the Department of 
Health's heatwave framework has been effective in reducing the impact of extreme 
heat on public health.  
To test this, the audit team examined whether: 
x agencies have plans in place that are evidence-based and meet requirements 
x governance arrangements are effective 
x resources are fit for purpose and effectively deployed 
x public health messages are appropriate and targeted 
x activation of heatwave plans is monitored and reported 
x the impact of extreme heat on public health has improved since 2009. 
The Department of Health's central and regional offices, Ambulance Victoria, the 
Health and Human Services Emergency Management Branch within the Department of 
Human Services, Victoria Police, the Department of Justice—which includes 
Emergency Management Victoria—and a selection of public health services and 
municipal councils were included in the audit.  
The Department of Environment and Primary Industries, Department of Transport, 
Planning and Local Infrastructure, and the Department of State Development, 
Business and Innovation were excluded from the scope as their roles relate largely to 
responding to infrastructure performance during a heatwave. Victoria’s critical 
infrastructure resilience has been independently reviewed in 2013 (Evans Review) with 
a new strategy currently being developed. 
1.6 Audit method and cost 
The audit methodology included: 
x reviewing relevant documents, such as: 
x heatwave emergency management plans, policies, standards and procedures 
x governance arrangements 
x debriefs, reviews and evaluations 
x staff training and development 
x heatwave communications 
x analysing relevant data—including ambulance callouts and hospital presentations 
x viewing key systems, such as the Heat Health Alert System and Heat Health 
Information Surveillance System 
x interviewing key emergency management personnel in the Department of Health 
and Department of Human Services central and regional offices, Ambulance 
Victoria, Victoria Police, and in three selected health services and three councils 
in locations at high risk of adverse outcomes from the impact of extreme heat 
x visiting the Health and Human Services State Emergency Management Centre, 
Ambulance Emergency Operations Centre, municipal councils and public health 
services, including public health services with residential aged care services   
Background 
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x assessing agencies’ response to the 2009 and 2014 heatwaves 
x consulting with other key stakeholders as identified through the audit. 
The audit was conducted in accordance with section 15 of the Audit Act 1994 and 
Australian Auditing and Assurance Standards. 
Pursuant to section 20(3) of the Audit Act 1994, any persons named in this report are 
not the subject of adverse comment or opinion. 
The total cost of the audit was $340 000. 
1.7 Structure of the report 
The report is structured as follows:  
x Part 2 examines the governance arrangements for heatwaves 
x Part 3 examines how agencies plan for heatwaves 
x Part 4 examines the response and activation of heatwave plans by agencies. 
 

Victorian Auditor-General’s Report  Heatwave Management: Reducing the Risk to Public Health        13 
2 Governance arrangements 
At a glance 
Background  
Governance is defined as the combination of processes and structures implemented 
by the governing body to inform, direct, manage, and monitor the activities of the 
agency towards the achievement of its objectives. Monitoring and reporting are key 
elements of good governance and provide opportunities for continuous improvement. 
Conclusion 
Governance arrangements for heatwaves are not clear, despite this being raised as an 
issue in both the 2009 and 2014 heatwave debriefs. Although there has been 
improvement since 2009, there is an ongoing lack of clarity in the sector regarding who 
is responsible for heatwave management, and a lack of recognition regarding the 
potential severity of the impact of heatwaves and the risks that they create for the 
community and to service delivery. The state response to heatwaves is being overseen 
at a functional level rather than a strategic level. 
Findings  
x Victoria Police's role as control agency for the response to heatwaves was only 
intended to be an interim arrangement. 
x Not all issues identified in the 2009 heatwave debrief have been addressed. 
x The 2014 heatwave debrief did not include all agencies with a recognised role in 
a heatwave emergency.  
Recommendation 
That Emergency Management Victoria, working with appropriate agencies, clarifies the 
control and other roles and responsibilities for heatwave arrangements. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The importance of effective emergency management governance arrangements 
cannot be overstated. The Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission's final report stated 
that, ‘ On 7 February 2009 state-level emergency management arrangements faltered 
as a result of confusion about responsibilities and accountability.’  
A key objective of the Emergency Management Act 2013 is to establish efficient 
governance arrangements that clarify the roles and responsibilities of agencies, 
facilitate cooperation between agencies, and ensure the coordination of emergency 
management reform within the emergency management sector. 
To assess the effectiveness of governance arrangements for heatwaves the audit 
examined whether: 
x roles and responsibilities were clearly defined and understood  
x appropriate monitoring and reporting arrangements were in place. 
2.2 Conclusion 
Governance arrangements for heatwaves are not clear, despite this being raised as an 
issue in both the 2009 and 2014 heatwave debriefs. While heatwaves are estimated to 
have contributed to more deaths than any other natural disaster nationally, there are 
no clear arrangements in place in Victoria to prepare for and drive the response to 
heatwaves. 
There is lack of clarity in the sector about who is responsible for heatwave 
management. The impact of heatwaves and the risk they present to the community 
and service delivery are not well understood. Although there have been improvements 
in governance since 2009, the state response to heatwaves is being overseen at a 
functional rather than a strategic level. This makes it difficult for the state to provide a 
coordinated response to prolonged heatwaves. 
2.3 Roles and responsibilities 
Roles and responsibilities for heatwave incidents are neither clear nor well understood. 
Currently, Victoria Police is listed in the Emergency Management Manual Victoria 
(EMMV) as the control agency for managing the response to heatwaves. However this 
was an interim arrangement after the 2009 heatwave and has not been reviewed 
since. Preparing and responding to heatwaves is not being managed in an integrated 
manner and there is no clear leadership to anchor this process. The lack of clear 
understanding and definition of a heatwave has contributed to the lack of clarity around 
heatwave management in Victoria. The recent creation of the Emergency Management 
Commissioner is likely to lead to greater role clarity and a more integrated response. 
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2.3.1 Are roles and responsibilities clearly defined? 
The EMMV identifies control and support agency roles. Support agency roles are split 
between community, public health, infrastructure and animal welfare—reflecting the 
impact of extreme heat on the community, public health, animals, and the operation of 
the state's electricity and transport infrastructure. The impact on public health is 
exacerbated when infrastructure fails.  
Until recently, a heatwave was not a recognised emergency in the EMMV. The decision 
to allocate the control role to Victoria Police, which was made at a State Emergency 
Response Planning Committee meeting in October 2009, was an interim arrangement. 
Under the emergency management arrangements, Victoria Police assume the control 
role when there is no clear agency to be allocated control of the incident. The interim 
arrangement for heatwaves has not been reviewed. 
Victoria Police has advised that it does not assume control of the response to a 
heatwave until there is a period of three continuous days where a heat health alert has 
been issued. This is when Victoria Police determines that there is a heatwave, which 
becomes an emergency, triggering the state arrangements. It did not assume active 
state-level control of the heatwave response in 2014 even though the period of 
extreme heat exceeded three days.  
The case study in Figure 2A is an example of how agencies can work together to meet 
the needs of their communities during a heatwave. In this example, Victoria Police was 
active early in the 2014 heatwave in response to infrastructure failure and the 
consequential impact of this on the rural community. 
  Figure 2A
Case study – Integrated response to heatwaves 
On 9 January 2014, the Chief Health Officer alerted the North East Weather District of 
forecast heatwave conditions for Tuesday 14 January. On January 13, a further alert was 
issued for 15 and 16 January.   
On 14 January, one of the major energy providers had scheduled maintenance in a location 
within this weather forecast district. Victoria Police became concerned about the significant 
impact the power outage was having on the community and liaised with the energy provider 
to restore power. 
Victoria Police at the local level worked with key agencies in response to the risk. 
Representatives from the Department of Human Services and the rural city council  
door-knocked in the affected area to provide residents with bottled water, and a relief centre 
was established in the local hotel. 
Victoria Police contacted the local media to let people know where water and relief were 
available and who to contact if they required water for livestock. 
Victoria Police checked on residents listed on the Vulnerable People's Register and the 
council contacted clients receiving Home and Community Care services. 
Power was restored to the community.  
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on information provided by an audited agency. 
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This case study highlights some of the issues with the current arrangements. While the 
Department of Health is best placed to respond to a public health emergency, Victoria 
Police has a played a lead role in directing the response to the consequences of 
heatwaves. Under the new legislation, the Emergency Management Commissioner 
has responsibility for consequence management—to minimise the adverse 
consequences to users of services or infrastructure when an interruption occurs as a 
consequence of a major emergency. 
2.3.2 Are roles and responsibilities understood? 
Not all audited agencies recognise that Victoria Police is the control agency for the 
response to heatwaves and reported receiving little or no direction from Victoria Police 
during the 2014 heatwave. If direction was provided, it was because of an associated 
threat of fire.  
Figure 2B shows the different agencies in other Australian jurisdictions that have been 
allocated responsibility to control the response to heatwaves under state emergency 
management arrangements.  
  Figure 2B
Control agency for heatwaves – Australian jurisdictions 
Victoria South Australia Western Australia New South Wales Queensland 
Victoria 
Police 
State Emergency 
Service 
Department of Health Commissioner of 
Police 
Queensland 
Health 
Source: Victorian Auditor General's Office. 
In its 2009 heatwave debrief, the Department of Health raised the issue that the EMMV 
does not include responsibility for control during a heatwave—despite the likelihood of 
increased heatwaves. In its 2014 debrief of the effectiveness of its State Health 
Emergency Response Plan (SHERP) in response to the heatwave, the department 
identified that closer liaison with Victoria Police on heat health, and not simply 
infrastructure, was needed. The department also noted that the control and command 
roles were not clear. 
Interviews with the Department of Health, Department of Human Services, Victoria 
Police and Ambulance Victoria all supported the need to clarify who is the control 
agency for heatwaves so that responsibilities are understood.  
Given the likelihood of more frequent and prolonged heatwaves, the objectives of the 
new legislation, and the findings from the Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission, the 
lack of clarity regarding roles and responsibilities for heatwave needs to be addressed 
as a matter of priority. 
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2.4 Monitoring and reporting arrangements  
Given the multiple consequential risks associated with periods of extreme heat, the 
current monitoring and reporting arrangements are not appropriate.  
While state-level governance structures were in place throughout the 2014 heatwave—
including the State Emergency Management Team—the main focus was more on 
preparing for the consequential risk of fire than for heatwaves and its impact on 
resources.  
Under Victoria's emergency management arrangements, Victoria Police—as the 
incident controller for heatwaves—is responsible for strategic management of the 
incident. Responsibilities include: 
x managing all response activities 
x notifying support agencies 
x establishing incident and emergency management teams 
x collecting, analysing and disseminating  information regarding the emergency 
x leading multi-agency response planning 
x issuing timely information and warnings to the community 
x developing incident action plans.  
The audit did not find evidence of Victoria Police strategically managing or assuming 
responsibility for the 2014 heatwave incident at the state level. For example, while the 
State Emergency Management Team held daily meetings in the State Control Centre, 
these meetings were more informative than strategic, with situation reports from each 
agency. There was no evidence of strategic consideration of the consequences of this 
information. The post season review conducted by Emergency Management Victoria 
supports this observation. 
Ambulance Victoria and the Department of Health developed incident action plans 
during the heatwave. As support agencies, their plans show functional level support 
but the plans did not provide an integrated ‘all agencies’ response to heatwaves. While 
there was evidence of heatwave management activity by Victoria Police at the regional 
level, this was isolated and not monitored in a strategic way. For example, the Hume 
region had an active champion leading the response in that region.  
Figure 2C shows the basic governance structure implemented by the Department of 
Health for the majority of the heatwave period in their State Emergency Management 
Centre.  
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  Figure 2C
Department of Health heatwave response structure 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's office based on Health and Human Services Emergency 
Management information. 
The State Health Incident Management Team structure was implemented for the 
response to heatwave from Tuesday 14 January 2014, when the centre was activated, 
until Saturday 18 January when the health incident arrangements were stood down. 
2.4.1 Monitoring arrangements 
State Emergency Management Team meetings were held throughout the heatwave 
and appropriately monitored identified risks, including: 
x the issuing of heat health alerts 
x expected increase in cardiac arrests 
x pressure on Ambulance Victoria's resources 
x increased pressure on power supply due to expected air conditioner use 
x heat fatigue on infrastructure 
x the risk to tourists being exposed to extreme heat. 
However, State Control Centre daily briefs show that the majority of information 
reported as the heatwave progressed was on preparedness for the consequential 
threat of fire. Monitoring the risk of fire included mapping and analysis of areas 
vulnerable to fire, and information about the potential for lightening, precipitation and 
synoptic forecasting for the state by the Bureau of Meteorology.     
On Monday 13 January 2014, the State Operations Centre in New South Wales (NSW) 
advised Victorian stakeholders, including Victoria Police, that NSW had activated their 
State Heatwave Sub Plan, due to advice from the Bureau of Meteorology that a 
heatwave would affect southern NSW until a cool change arrived on Friday.  
State health 
coordinator
Planning officer Logistics officerPublic information officerOperations officer
Health incident 
management 
team
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The Department of Health's daily situation reports included health surveillance data, 
other weather information such as fire status, and reports from health services such as 
Ambulance Victoria. However, while issues with power supply and demand on 
ambulance services are captured in these reports, the reports are primarily at the 
operations level. For example, one situation report stated that the department was 
receiving conflicting information about the available power supply across the state—if 
the management of the response to the 2014 heatwave was monitored and reported 
effectively, all agencies with key roles in heatwave response would be hearing the 
same message. Lack of clear information indicates that this is not happening in a 
coordinated manner through the relevant communication channels, or emanating from 
a lead agency. 
The Ambulance Emergency Operations Centre was effectively utilised. Ambulance 
Victoria's health incident action plans were more comprehensive than the heatwave 
plans developed by other agencies and included mapping, resource needs, and 
activities being actioned. As the health commander in the field, Ambulance Victoria is 
best able to monitor and report on the impact of extreme heat across the state and 
across incidents. 
Incident management systems 
Integration of incident management systems provides greater interoperability—one of 
the key objectives of the current legislative arrangements. However, the audit found 
that during the January 2014 heatwave none of the audited agencies shared the same 
incident management system, although there was limited access to the municipal 
council system. In some cases, no information was captured in the system at all. 
The emergency management centre operated by the Department of Health did not 
capture all actions in its incident management system—with multiple sources holding 
pieces of information. However, it did report on the preparedness of health services to 
respond to the heatwave. As health services consider heatwaves to be a risk to 
business-as-usual operations—because of the threat to critical hospital infrastructure—
they do not respond to heatwave as an emergency incident unless it extends their 
capacity to respond or results in infrastructure failure. 
Victoria Police established an incident in their emergency management system for the 
heatwave, however, it did not provide any evidence of a lead response to this incident. 
There was insufficient interaction with other support agencies. Instead, the system 
captured the operational response, including copies of heat health alerts issued and 
daily state control centre briefings. 
By contrast, the incident management system used by Ambulance Victoria provided an 
active view of its actions in managing its operational response to the heatwave. This 
included building resource capacity and monitoring of its incident action plans.  
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The Interim Emergency Management Strategic Action Plan, released in July 2014 by 
Emergency Management Victoria, includes implementing the first stage of a common 
operating system across key emergency services. The results of this first stage will 
inform the development of a business case for a full common emergency information 
platform.   
Comparing the issues raised in the 2009 and 2014 heatwave debriefs conducted by 
the various key agencies, it is clear that the lack of an integrated system remains an 
issue. The current move towards developing a common operating system should help 
improve the level of interoperability, a key objective of the Emergency Management Act 
2013. 
2.4.2 Reporting arrangements 
There has not been an integrated 'all hazards, all agencies' approach adopted to 
debrief on the 2014 heatwave event. While the Department of Health conducted a 
debrief of SHERP on 29 January 2014, there was no debrief that included all agencies 
with a recognised role in a heatwave emergency. Yet it is critical that all agencies come 
together to learn from the incident. 
Audited councils did not conduct debriefs. There was also no reference to the 
heatwave in the minutes of municipal emergency management planning committee 
meetings after the heatwave period.  
While Victoria Police did not conduct a specific heatwave debrief with all support 
agencies with roles in responding to heatwaves, it participated in a broader statewide 
post-summer season review that examined both fire and heatwave related issues.   
The Department of Health's January 2014 debrief identified the following 
governance-related issues: 
x a lack of clear understanding by regions and health services about the role of 
Health Command in leading the health response  
x a need for better communication with regions  
x confusion over how much assurance the department was able to get from health 
services given the devolved structure 
x the risk in not monitoring health service preparedness 
x health service debriefs should be conducted 
x limited follow up and much assumption about what activation of heatwave plans 
actually means in practice in councils 
x the need to build redundancy into the incident management leadership team. 
A comparison between the heatwave debrief conducted in 2009 and the individual 
debriefs conducted by agencies after the 2014 heatwave shows that while some 
improvements have been made, some key issues remain. Figure 2D shows areas of 
improvement since 2009, as well as issues identified in the earlier heatwave that have 
not yet been fully addressed. 
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  Figure 2D
Lessons learnt from heatwave debriefs in 2009 and 2014 
Improvements since 2009 Issues common to both 2009 and 2014 
Heatwaves are now a recognised 
emergency in the EMMV 
The integration of Ambulance Victoria into 
the Department of Health's emergency 
response centre provided a better health 
response 
Emergency management structures are 
consistent across tiers and within centres 
The Department of Health’s State 
Emergency Management Centre has 
developed an operations manual  
Training of staff in emergency management 
roles has increased 
Heatwave framework elements have been 
developed. 
 
Clarity around roles and responsibilities 
Sufficiency of strategic monitoring 
Clarity around triggers for activation of 
heatwave plans 
Planning for business continuity 
Involving more agencies in control centres 
and debriefs 
Clarifying the role of councils 
Sharing of data across multiple systems 
Determining the most appropriate data 
needs for monitoring purposes 
Involving more agencies in training and 
exercises 
Improving public communication messages 
Streamlining the number of warnings issued 
Confirming the effectiveness of warnings. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
The absence of a lead agency to take responsibility for the response to heatwaves 
means it is less likely that the individual reports are considered in an integrated way. 
The failure to undertake a heatwave-focused debrief as a group, after the 2014 
heatwave, compounds this issue. 
Recommendation 
1. That Emergency Management Victoria, working with appropriate agencies, 
clarifies the control and other roles and responsibilities for heatwave 
arrangements. 
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3 Preparedness to respond to heatwaves 
At a glance 
Background  
Emergency Risks in Victoria – Report of the 2012–13 State Emergency Risk Assessment 
identified heatwaves as one of 15 emergency risks to have potentially significant 
consequences if realised. Being well prepared to respond to a heatwave requires agencies 
to have plans in place that are evidence-based and meet requirements, and sufficient staff 
capacity and capability to respond.  
Conclusion 
Agencies are not well prepared to respond to heatwaves. They do not all have 
evidence-based plans that meet requirements because there are currently no standardised 
requirements to develop sub-plans of the State Emergency Response Plan.  
The lack of an integrated planning framework means the quality of state and municipal 
planning, including risk assessment, is variable and that agency shortfalls cannot be 
identified and addressed. 
Findings  
x There are no minimum requirements for the development of a state-level plan.  
x The Heatwave Plan for Victoria is an operational plan, not a state-level plan for 
heatwaves. 
x The quality of municipal heatwave plans is not monitored or reviewed. 
x Not all agencies sufficiently plan for resource needs during summer. 
x There is no assurance that health services are well prepared for the risk of critical 
infrastructure failure. 
Recommendations 
That Emergency Management Victoria: 
x facilitates the development and implementation of coordinated whole-of-government 
heatwave arrangements  
x facilitates the development of guidelines, including appropriate minimum standards for 
content in state-level sub-plans of the State Emergency Response Plan 
x in developing the new emergency management planning legislation, clarifies the role 
of municipal councils and includes a quality assurance mechanism for municipal 
emergency management planning.  
That the Department of Health assures itself that public health services are well prepared to 
manage the risk of critical infrastructure failure during a heatwave.  
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3.1 Introduction 
The 2011 Green Paper, Towards a More Disaster Resilient and Safer Victoria, 
acknowledged risk-based planning and mitigation measures as critical to minimising 
the impact of emergencies and increasing community resilience. Being well prepared 
to respond to a heatwave requires agencies to have plans in place that are 
evidence-based and meet requirements, and sufficient and appropriate resources to 
be able to respond appropriately.  
3.2 Conclusion 
Agencies are not well prepared to respond to heatwaves. They do not all have plans in 
place that are evidence-based and there are no clearly articulated minimum 
requirements to guide the development of sub-plans of the State Emergency 
Response Plan (SERP).  
The quality of planning at the state and municipal level, including the risk assessment 
process, is variable. There is no integrated planning framework to strengthen the 
quality of state and local-level incident plans and provide assurance that agencies are 
well prepared to respond. As a consequence of the weaknesses in heatwave planning, 
shortfalls in the preparedness of key agencies are not identified and addressed 
appropriately.  
3.3 Quality of planning 
The audit assessed whether Victoria Police, the Department of Health (the 
department), Ambulance Victoria, and a selection of municipal councils and their 
neighbouring health services were well prepared to respond to heatwaves, including 
whether they:  
x had plans in place that were evidence-based—informed by better practice, past 
reviews and evaluations 
x had plans that met requirements in legislation, policy and standards 
x planned for sufficient and appropriate resources. 
3.3.1 Do plans meet requirements? 
There are no requirements specified for emergency management incident plans. This 
is because SERP does not provide any guidance, and standards have yet to be 
developed. 
The Heatwave Plan for Victoria – Protecting health and reducing 
harm from heatwaves 
While the Heatwave Plan for Victoria assumes the title of a state plan, it is not 
commensurate with, or recognised as, a state-level plan in the emergency 
management arrangements. Sub-plans of the SERP include a State Bushfire Plan, 
State Flood Emergency Plan, State Tsunami Plan and the Victorian Emergency Animal 
Welfare Plan. There is no heatwave sub-plan. 
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There is no guidance in the Emergency Management Manual Victoria (EMMV) around 
minimum requirements or standards for development of state-level emergency 
management plans. An assessment of a sample of state-recognised sub-plans of the 
SERP found a lack of consistent content and form, including recognisable branding as 
a state-approved sub-plan of the SERP. While the lack of consistent branding had 
been identified in October 2010 by the Victorian Emergency Management Council, no 
changes have been made to the suite of plans listed in the EMMV as sub-plans of the 
SERP. 
The Heatwave Plan for Victoria explains the elements of the department's heatwave 
framework and who is vulnerable in a heatwave emergency. However, it does not: 
x adequately refer to the roles and responsibilities of other support agencies 
x clearly articulate the phases of an emergency and the requirements at each 
phase  
x make reference to Victoria Police as the control agency during a heatwave.  
Its content indicates it is more of an operational plan of the State Health Emergency 
Response Plan than a state-level incident plan for heatwaves, as a sub-plan of the 
SERP. 
Victoria Police 
Victoria Police, as the control agency for the response to heatwaves, does not have an 
appropriate response plan in place. In consultation with the department and other 
agencies, Victoria Police developed an Extreme Heat Event Plan, which was endorsed 
by the State Emergency Response Planning Committee in October 2010 as an interim 
plan. This interim plan was never intended to be a sub-plan of the SERP, and was 
developed to fill a void. Victoria Police is finalising a new heatwave operational plan 
which is intended to be released for the 2014–15 fire danger period.  
Municipal councils 
The role and requirements of councils in emergency management planning are not 
clear. Key planning and assurance requirements that exist under the 1986 legislation 
have yet to be reflected in the 2013 legislation. These include the requirement for 
councils to appoint a municipal emergency management planning committee, prepare 
and maintain a municipal emergency management plan (MEMP), and have the plan 
audited by the State Emergency Service (SES) every three years.   
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The audit reviewed heatwaves and emergency management planning in three regions 
identified as being at high risk of adverse health impacts from heatwaves. Each of the 
councils visited during the audit had a heatwave plan. One council had developed a 
multi-year emergency management schedule, which included committee meeting 
dates, and review dates for all council plans. This was an example of better practice. 
However, because there are various pieces of legislation for heatwaves where a 
heatwave plan could be developed—each with different levels of oversight of the 
planning process—the audit was unable to determine whether all councils in the state 
have a heatwave plan and whether these plans are of high quality and subject to 
regular review. 
As Emergency Management Victoria (EMV) progressively reviews the current 
emergency arrangements, it will be opportune for EMV to clarify the role of municipal 
councils and to consider a quality assurance mechanism for municipal emergency 
management planning arrangements. 
Health services 
Health services accommodate and care for some of the state's most vulnerable 
people, who are particularly susceptible to extreme heat. For health services, a 
significant risk during a heatwave is the failure of critical infrastructure, such as air 
conditioning, including chillers, and the performance of emergency generators.  
Health services plan for heatwaves as part of business continuity planning and in 
response to the department's Emergency Preparedness Clients and Services Policy.  
The policy advises health services that they must have emergency management plans 
in place, including activation triggers and communication arrangements. These plans 
should be reviewed, exercised, and updated regularly. 
Recognising the risk of critical infrastructure failure, and given that health services are 
self-governing bodies, the department provides $25 million annually as part of the 
Engineering Infrastructure Program. However, the department does not mandate what 
equipment health services purchase, monitor maintenance of engineering 
infrastructure, or require health services to conduct power failure testing such as 'black 
start' tests. The department advised that this was the responsibility of health services 
as self-governing bodies. 
In the January 2014 heatwave, the State Emergency Management Team was advised 
that hospitals might lose power on 16 January 2014 due to the forecast temperatures 
and the inability of the system to cool down. On 16 January 2014, Casey Hospital and 
Dandenong Hospital lost power and their emergency generators failed, which led to 
ongoing issues with air conditioning, water supply, lifts and medical equipment at 
Casey Hospital. Other health services experienced power failure during the heatwave, 
including Ouyen and Manangatang hospitals.  
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Figure 3A is an example of a health service response to an actual infrastructure 
failure—a fire in a power substation—during the 2014 heatwave. This occurred on 
Thursday 16 January 2014. The temperature on this day reached 41.4qC in this 
community. In the same week, fires blocked the major freeway and threatened homes. 
It shows the range of actions the health service took to identify and treat the impact of 
the incident on business continuity and patient care. 
  Figure 3A
Case study – Health service response to  
infrastructure failure, 16 January 2014 
Fire in power substation 
A loss of power across the region, at a major shopping centre and at various hospital sites 
resulted in the health service taking the following actions: 
x activated hospital incident management team 
x deployed senior staff to affected sites, sourced additional staff  
x advised staff to leave early to avoid major highway traffic blockages 
x contacted power company for updates—priority listed site 
x delivered ice to affected sites and changed meals to cold food 
x considered implications for drug storage  
x considered impact of traffic light/boom gate failures  
x assessed patient health status and illnesses of concern 
x alerted that the pharmacy was closed due to power outage—increased emergency 
department presentations likely 
x anticipated possible surge in emergency department 
x considered bed management contingencies and re-opening of wards  
x monitored Ambulance Victoria activities 
x planned for possible evacuation—transport, alternate sites 
x reviewed actions and advised senior management of lessons learned. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office based on information provided by the audited agency. 
While the department contacted health services during the 2014 heatwave and 
specifically requested confirmation on generators, this was not its usual or planned 
practice. As the department relies on health services self-reporting of infrastructure 
failure it is not known if other health services experienced failure during the 2014 
heatwave.  
Our examination of health service business continuity plans identified that health 
services had measures in place, such as load shedding, to manage the consequences 
of infrastructure failure. However, not all audited health service business continuity 
plans identified how long the health service could maintain operations should their 
generator or air conditioning systems fail. One of the larger health services had 
identified the risk of infrastructure failure and estimated that they would have less than 
five hours before needing to purchase or hire a new generator. After two hours, air 
conditioning, security and mortuary refrigeration system are at significant risk and the 
health service would be seeking support from other larger health services, particularly 
to relocate bodies from the mortuary.  
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As part of summer preparedness activities, both the department and health services 
should assure themselves that the risks associated with critical infrastructure failure 
during a heatwave are being appropriately managed. 
3.3.2 Are plans evidence based? 
Evidence-based emergency planning requires plans to be developed based on 
complete and accurate information and for risk-based assessments to have been 
completed. The audit found a lack of risk management expertise and quality assurance 
of heatwave planning at the local level. 
By 2011, all 79 councils had been supported to develop heatwave plans, either as part 
of their municipal emergency management plan (MEMP) or as part of their municipal 
public health and wellbeing plan. The Heatwave Planning Guide – Development of 
heatwave plans in local councils in Victoria and toolkit were developed by the 
Department of Health to support this process.  
The audit identified that municipal emergency management planning was often 
reactive and not sufficiently risk based to adequately inform the development of 
sub-plans to the MEMP. These sub-plans, such as flood, pandemic and heatwave, rely 
on a risk assessment, with higher rated risks triggering the requirement for a sub-plan.  
While there is a quality control process in place, through municipal emergency 
management planning committees, and an assurance mechanism, through SES audits 
of the MEMP every three years, there is a lack of risk management expertise and 
quality assurance at the local level. The SES audit process does not examine 
sub-plans—such as for heatwaves—or the quality of plans.  
Review of the 2013 legislation provides an opportunity for Emergency Management 
Victoria to clarify the role of municipal councils and to consider a quality assurance 
mechanism over municipal emergency management planning arrangements. The 1986 
legislation includes the requirements for municipal emergency management plans, 
planning committees and the auditing of plans. Given the intent of the emergency 
management reform agenda to build community resilience, arming community leaders 
with sufficient expertise to build collective knowledge needs to be a consideration in 
any review of the existing arrangements. Collaborating across councils or having a 
specialist emergency management leader work across councils to improve the 
planning process would also be beneficial.   
Evaluation of the Heatwave Plan for Victoria and Heatwave 
Planning Guide 
The Heatwave Plan for Victoria and the Heatwave Planning Guide have not been 
updated since they were examined as part of an external evaluation of the Department 
of Health's heatwave framework in 2011. In that evaluation, 14 recommendations were 
made to improve the Heatwave Plan for Victoria, and three recommendations were 
made to improve the Heatwave Planning Guide. 
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An examination of the recommendations directed at improving the Heatwave Plan for 
Victoria, found that a number were merely suggestions and some are now obsolete.  
Recommendations not implemented included: 
x clarity around the roles and responsibilities for control of a heatwave response, 
and the role of the regional office 
x clarification of the trigger for activation of a heatwave plan 
x broader stakeholder consultation to inform the heatwave plan 
x distribution of communication resources from a single point 
x inclusion of a communications strategy and stakeholder list. 
The Heatwave Planning Guide recommendations were largely targeted at support 
tools and information provision to councils that did not require amendment to the 
guide. These recommendations have been implemented. 
3.4 Surge capacity and capability planning 
Sufficient and appropriate resources are not always available across all agencies to 
respond to heatwaves. Reduced staffing over the summer months affected some 
agencies' ability to respond effectively during both the 2009 and 2014 heatwaves. 
SERP requires agencies to deploy resources to counter the effects of, or threat from, 
an emergency event. The audit assessed whether agencies had planned for sufficient 
and appropriate resources to respond to a heatwave.  
3.4.1 Surge capacity 
Heatwaves generally occur over summer when people take leave and there are 
increased numbers of visitors or tourists in Melbourne and surrounding areas. 
Reduced staffing affected the ability of some agencies to respond effectively during the 
2009 and 2014 heatwaves.  
All agencies reported difficulty in identifying which summer events were being held to 
enable them to plan for the additional demand that might be placed on service 
provision. Despite most events requiring a permit, there is no central database of 
events to assist agencies to plan for the influx of people, including information on 
where crowds are congregating. Instead, agencies spend time trying to source 
information on when and where events are occurring, often from each other, to plan for 
sufficient resources and maintain business continuity.  
Municipal councils had to recall staff from holidays to make contact with vulnerable 
members of the community, whereas health services reduce their schedules over 
summer and were able to open up extra wards to accommodate the more vulnerable. 
Demand for ambulance services 
To meet the significant demand on its resources, Ambulance Victoria needed to bring 
in additional resources to be able to respond to demand during the January 2014 
heatwave.  
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During that heatwave, the Triple Zero call-taker—Emergency Services 
Telecommunications Authority—responded to the highest ever number of calls for 
ambulance services. The record was set on Thursday 16 January, and then eclipsed 
the following day, on Friday 17 January. 
Ambulance Victoria plans its resource needs a year in advance using a request and 
allocation process to inform their 'Resource Model'. The emergency operations area of 
Ambulance Victoria bids for resources as part of this process. For example, during the 
2014 heatwave, Ambulance Victoria's Emergency Operations Centre had to request 
the provision of two additional paramedics to service the Ballarat region. This 
allocation was taken from the budgeted allowance in the resource model.  
For additional resources, the Emergency Operations Centre has to organise additional 
vehicles and staff, usually by recalling staff from leave or through partnering 
arrangements with other emergency services. Additionally, Ambulance Victoria vehicles 
were recalled from scheduled maintenance to meet demand, which included 
movement of these resources across the state.  
On 14 January 2014, heat health alerts had been issued for the whole of Victoria and 
were predicted to last until Friday 17 January in most districts. On this day—the 
second day of the heat health alerts being issued—the consequential impact of the 
heatwave on resources was already evident, not only on Ambulance Victoria but on 
other state emergency services.  For example, bottled water was delivered to hydrate 
paramedics, fire-related road blockages hampered ambulance access to locations and 
additional crews were called to respond to firefighters suffering the effects of the heat. 
While many of the activities highlighted are planned to address the risks associated 
with extreme heat conditions, they test the surge capacity of responding services, 
particularly when the community struggles to adapt to the conditions. 
Ambulance Victoria has recognised that streamlining resource requests will improve 
the management of increased surge in an emergency and is currently developing an 
appropriate system to better address this. 
3.4.2 Capability to respond 
The state has yet to be fully tested on its ability to respond effectively to a prolonged 
heatwave. While training and emergency incident exercises are regularly provided for 
other incidents, there is insufficient recognition that the impact of extreme heat extends 
beyond public health and can drain available resources early.  
Because the state has not developed a state level heatwave plan, the response to a 
heatwave emergency has not been tested or assessed. 
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All audited health services and municipal councils provided emergency management 
training to staff, usually through municipal emergency management planning 
committees and Victorian hospitals’ emergency management committees. However, 
training is not integrated, with agencies organising training exercises through their 
respective planning and response committees in isolation from each other. Because of 
the lack of integrated training, more innovative and well-developed training exercises 
are not shared in a systematic way. 
None of the audited councils had participated in an emergency management exercise 
with a heatwave component. However, one of the health services had conducted 
exercises that included a heatwave component linked to the failure of critical 
infrastructure. This is better practice given that critical infrastructure failure is a key risk 
to health services during a heatwave. 
Figure 3B is taken from Exercise Devine which was conducted in November 2013, 
organised by one of the municipal emergency management planning committees, and 
involved all agencies in the region. This exercise, which includes extreme heat as a 
risk, could be applied to any incident where one of the consequences is power failure.  
  Figure 3B
Exercise Devine – A hypothetical power outage, 2013 
For the past three days the temperature has been hovering around 38 degrees, with 
overnight temperatures in the low- to mid-twenties. 
At 4.16 am there was a major state disaster which has affected the State of Victoria. For the 
purpose of this exercise, the power outage has been caused by a significant disruption on 
the electricity transmission and/or distribution network. 
While this disaster is affecting other parts of the state, this exercise focuses on three 
municipalities in the western suburbs and the impacts of a localised hypothetical power 
outage across these three neighbouring municipalities. 
Initial assessments indicate repair activities for the state will take around three weeks. The 
electricity company will be required to source, transport and install transportable and 
temporary replacement power equipment to support the three municipalities.  
The electricity provider will experience significant delays to tie this equipment into the 
existing system given the nature and impacted areas of the disaster. It is anticipated that it 
will take approximately 72 hours to achieve full restoration. Restoration has commenced 
and, in the best case scenario, be available in three days. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-Generals Office, using Exercise Devine information. 
In Exercise Devine, participants were asked to review their emergency management 
plans and determine how they would respond, and identify their key dependencies and 
the implications for business continuity.  
A more proactive approach should be taken to heatwave preparedness by ensuring 
training covers a prolonged heatwave scenario. Training activities should test agency 
plans for such an event. Such a process will inform and improve the quality of agency 
planning. 
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Recommendations 
That Emergency Management Victoria: 
2. facilitates the development and implementation of coordinated 
whole-of-government heatwave arrangements  
3. facilitates the development of guidelines, including appropriate minimum 
standards for content in state-level sub-plans of the State Emergency Response 
Plan 
4. in developing the new emergency management planning legislation, clarifies the 
role of municipal councils and includes a quality assurance mechanism for 
municipal emergency management planning. 
That the Department of Health: 
5. assures itself that public health services are well prepared to manage the risk of 
critical infrastructure failure during a heatwave. 
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4 Activation and response to heatwaves 
At a glance 
Background  
Public health messages and activation of heatwave plans by councils and community 
organisations that support vulnerable communities are two key actions taken to 
mitigate the risk that heatwaves present to public health.  
Conclusion 
The Department of Health's heatwave framework is sound and its Heat Health 
Information Surveillance System has improved understanding of the impact of extreme 
heat on public health in Victoria. However, its effectiveness is reduced because it is 
being applied selectively by agencies. Failure to provide sufficient and appropriate 
education, information and messages denies the community the opportunity to build 
resilience to manage extreme heat events and thereby reduce reliance on government 
intervention. 
Findings  
x Heat health alerts are not always clear or timely. 
x The Heat Health Alert System does not follow the Victorian Warning Protocol and 
issue warnings using a phased approach.  
x There is insufficient public education on the impact of extreme heat on public 
health—especially compared to other extreme weather events. 
x Heatwave surveillance information does not sufficiently inform agency planning 
activities. 
Recommendations 
That the Department of Health: 
x develops a communication strategy for heatwaves that includes public awareness 
and education activities 
x implements a phased approach to heat health alert warning categories in line 
with the Victorian Warning Protocol 
x reviews the purpose and effectiveness of the Heat Health Information 
Surveillance System during a heatwave. 
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4.1 Introduction 
In February 2014, the government released Emergency Risks in Victoria – Report Of 
The 2012–13 State Emergency Risk Assessment, which identified two key actions to 
mitigate the risk that heatwaves present to public health—public health messages and 
activation of heatwave plans by councils and community organisations that support 
vulnerable communities. Activation refers to the circumstances under which an agency 
applies its heatwave plan. 
The Department of Health's (the department) heatwave framework, which aims to 
reduce the impact of extreme heat on public health, consists of the Heatwave Plan for 
Victoria, the Heatwave Planning Guide – Development of heatwave plans in local 
councils in Victoria for municipal councils, the Heat Health Alert System (HHAS), the 
Heat Health Information Surveillance System (HHISS) and communication resources. 
The audit assessed whether agencies had effectively applied the framework by 
examining whether: 
x public health messages were appropriate—for example, clear, timely and 
well-targeted 
x heatwave plans were appropriately activated, monitored and reported 
x the impact of extreme heat on public health had improved since 2009. 
4.2 Conclusion 
While the department's heatwave framework is consistent with international better 
practice, its effectiveness is reduced because its elements are being applied 
selectively by agencies. Lack of widespread understanding of the impact of extreme 
heat on public health means that public messaging needs to be targeting the whole 
community and not only the most vulnerable, who are less able to respond effectively 
without support. The ability of the community to adapt and build resilience to manage 
extreme heat events, and so reduce reliance on government intervention, depends on 
being able to access and understand the necessary information.  
4.3 Public health messages 
Public health messages are not always appropriate or well-targeted. This is because 
HHAS is not well understood and fails to target the whole community. Unlike other 
extreme weather events, extreme heat does not receive widespread media attention or 
advice about the potentially significant risks to health and how to prepare for and manage 
these risks. By contrast, 'sheep graziers alerts' are included on the Bureau of 
Meteorology website and on news channels during winter. 
The department's communication resources and HHAS are the two key mechanisms in 
place to educate the community on the impact of extreme heat on public health and to 
warn about impending extreme heat conditions. This Part looks at the appropriateness 
of heat health alerts and whether public health messages meet the needs of the 
community. 
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4.3.1 Are heat health alerts clear and timely? 
Heat health alerts are not always clear or timely. The HHAS, while soundly based, is 
applied selectively by the department and recipients. HHAS is intended to notify 
councils, departmental program areas, hospitals, and health and community service 
providers of forecast heatwave conditions likely to impact on human health, three to 
four days prior to the day of extreme heat. The Chief Health Officer authorises a heat 
health alert, which is emailed to key stakeholders.  
The State Emergency Response Plan details 12 nationally recognised principles to be 
followed in providing warnings to the community. Figure 4A shows the extent to which 
the HHAS reflects these principles. 
  Figure 4A
Community warning principles and Heat Health Alert System 
Community warning principles 
Heat Health 
Alert System 
Coordinated—warning system should avoid duplication of effort and 
support a shared understanding 
 
Authoritative and accountable—warnings should be disseminated on 
the decision of an authorised person 
 
Consistent/Standards-based—information content should be 
coordinated and consistent across all warning mechanisms 
 
Complete—the message should include all relevant details, be easily 
understood and target the entire community 
 
Multi-modal—the use of a variety of delivery mechanisms should be 
complementary and allow maximum reach to the affected community 
 
All hazards based—should be capable of providing warning for any 
type of emergency 
N/A 
Targeted—messages should be targeted to those 'at risk' to reduce 
complacency from 'over warning' 
 
Interoperable—coordinated delivery methods should be capable of 
operation across jurisdictional borders 
 
Accessible and responsive—warning systems should be developed 
with capability to respond to, and deliver warnings in, an environment of 
demographic, social and technological change 
 
Verifiable—the warning is able to be verified by the community, to 
reduce accidental activations and prevent malicious attempts to issue 
false alerts 
 
Underpinned by education and awareness raising activities—
agencies should be active in the community to raise awareness and 
educate people regarding emergency warning systems/mechanisms 
and the language used in warnings for particular emergencies 
 
Compatible—the warning system should be compatible with existing 
telecommunications networks and infrastructure to avoid adverse 
impacts on their functional integrity 
 
Note: N/A refers to a principle that is not relevant to the system under examination. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on the Victorian Warning Protocol. 
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The principles are included in the Victorian Warning Protocol, which was established to 
provide emergency response agencies with coordinated and consistent direction on 
advice and/or warnings. Figure 4A shows several key elements that are absent in the 
HHAS, including the completeness of the warning and the 'all hazards' approach. 
Timeliness of alerts 
Alerts are not always timely. In the January 2014 heatwave, around 36 per cent of 
alerts were not issued within three to four days prior to the day of extreme heat. The 
department monitors a selection of weather stations throughout the state. Specific 
stations within each weather forecast district have been identified in consultation with 
the Bureau of Meteorology as the trigger stations for issuing an alert. This means that 
areas within a district may be forecast to exceed the heat health temperature threshold 
but receive no warning if the trigger location is not forecast to meet or exceed the 
threshold.  
Figure 4B shows the number of days warning provided before the forecast heatwave. 
In some cases, the temperature is only forecast to meet or exceed the threshold one to 
two days prior. For example, an alert was issued for East Gippsland on 16 January for 
17 January, because the threshold was only forecast to be exceeded the day before. 
However, the alert issued for the Northern Country on 13 January for 15 January was 
forecast to be exceeded as early as 9 January. Alerts may also be delayed because 
the department does not assess forecast data or issue alerts on weekends. A lower 
number indicates a shorter warning time being provided. 
  Figure 4B
Number of days warning provided by weather forecast district – 2014 
Weather forecast 
district  13 Jan 14 Jan 15 Jan 16 Jan 17 Jan 18 Jan 
Central N/R 5 2 3 2 N/R 
East Gippsland N/R 4 N/R N/R 1 N/R 
Mallee 4 5 2 3 N/R N/R 
North Central 4 5 2 3 4 N/R 
North East N/R 5 2 3 4 2 
Northern Country NA 5 2 3 2 N/R 
South West N/R 1 2 3 N/R N/R 
West and South 
Gippsland 
N/R 4 0 N/R 2 N/R 
Wimmera N/R 5 2 3 N/R N/R 
Note: N/R means that an alert was not required for that location for that date.  
NA means that although the temperature was identified to meet or exceed the threshold, no alert was 
issued. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on the Department of Health heat health alert 
workings, using forecast temperatures and heat health alerts issued in 2014. 
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Figure 4B shows that in some cases, such as West and South Gippsland on 
15 January, there was no early warning, with the alert being issued on the same day 
as the temperature was forecast to meet or exceed the heat health threshold. In some 
cases the department did not issue an alert when the trigger location was forecast to 
meet or exceed the threshold until a number of days after first identified. By applying 
the framework selectively, the timeliness of alerts is reduced. 
Case study: Central weather forecast district 
The central weather forecast district covers 40 individual municipal councils—50 per 
cent of all councils—including Ballarat City Council, Melbourne City Council, Greater 
Geelong City Council and Mornington Peninsula Shire Council. Figure 4C shows the 
varying mean temperatures across a sample of weather stations in this district. The 
threshold for the central forecast district is 30ºC. As Figure 4C shows, some locations 
reached the threshold and some did not.   
  Figure 4C
Central weather forecast district temperature comparison, 2014 
Date 
Mornington 
Peninsula 
Shire 
Council 
Ballarat 
City 
Council 
Brimbank 
City 
Council 
(based on 
Essendon) 
Bass Coast 
Shire 
Council 
(based on 
Wonthaggi) 
Casey City 
Council 
(based on 
Cranbourne) 
Greater 
Geelong 
City 
Council 
14 Jan 33.10ºC 32.05ºC 36.10ºC 31.65ºC 34.15ºC 35.10ºC 
15 Jan 30.50ºC 29.90ºC 33.65ºC 29.95ºC 30.35ºC 30.10ºC 
16 Jan 32.85ºC 30.65ºC 33.10ºC 28.95ºC 29.05ºC 31.20ºC 
17 Jan 28.75ºC 29.25ºC 32.30ºC 30.60ºC 29.80ºC 32.05ºC 
Source:  Victorian Auditor-General's Office, using Bureau of Meteorology data. 
The temperature variability shown in Figure 4C—with variance being as much as 4ºC 
—highlights the importance of monitoring local conditions to determine what strategies 
need to be adopted. For example, councils may need to decide whether to continue 
home visits to the elderly or to conduct welfare checks by phone. Differences in mean 
temperatures may require different responses in locations within the same district in 
order to protect vulnerable communities.  
Clarity of alerts 
Alerts are not always clear and are not consistent or interoperable with warning 
systems used for other emergency incidents. The content of alerts in 2014 did not 
always change as the heatwave progressed. 
On the day after the last heat health alert in both the 2009 and 2014 heatwaves, 
ambulance services, health services and the Coroner were still experiencing high 
demand. The department needs to assess the purpose of the alert system and 
determine how a phased approach might enable agencies to remain alert to the 
continuing impact and risk of heat on public health after the heatwave has ended. 
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Other jurisdictions' heatwave plans, and other extreme weather alerts, adopt a phased 
approach. Under the Victorian Warnings Protocol 2013, it is recommended that 
agencies identify the warning category for alerts—advice, watch and act, and 
emergency warning—to inform communities of an impending or current threat and to 
promote appropriate actions. 
All audited councils had developed extreme heat policies to manage the impact of heat 
on staff. Councils also forwarded the heat health alert internally to staff responsible for 
Home and Community Care (HACC) programs, which provide services such as the 
delivery of meals, domestic cleaning, home maintenance and social support to the 
elderly. 
Figure 4D is an example of how a heat health alert is disseminated by councils. The 
audit found that there was no consistent method adopted, although the sampled 
councils all advised their HACC teams.  
  Figure 4D
Dissemination of a heat health alert by councils 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on information provided by councils. 
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The subjectivity attached to the issuing of heat health alerts, the variable approaches 
by councils in responding to these alerts, and the lack of consistent language in 
warning systems, present a risk to the community—particularly the most vulnerable—
and to agencies that are unable to adequately determine how critical the warnings are. 
4.3.2 Do messages meet the needs of the community? 
Public health messages do not meet the needs of the community. They are not easily 
understood and do not target the whole community. While messages are primarily 
targeted to the most at risk—the aged and infirm—they need to be more broadly 
disseminated and sufficiently detailed so that the community fully understands the 
significance of the impact of extreme heat on public health. Building community 
resilience in this way will help reduce reliance on government intervention, particularly 
on Ambulance Victoria as the first port of call for a heat-related condition emergency. 
The department has conducted Regional Health and Ageing Summer Preparedness 
forums throughout regional Victoria and in Melbourne for a number of years. These 
forums target agency staff and service providers. The department also provides 
information on how to develop heatwave plans and which activities should be 
conducted to support the plan—such as staff training. 
Information for people vulnerable to extreme heat 
Information is not always clear to the targeted groups. During the 2014 heatwave, 
multiple emergency incidents were in progress—including fires, the threat of power 
failure and heatwave conditions. Despite joint media conferences by emergency 
management leaders, stakeholders still reported hearing contradictory messages 
about fire awareness, energy consumption and keeping cool. For example, 
stakeholders reported that elderly Victorians, who are among the most vulnerable to 
extreme heat, were restricting the use of air conditioners because of advice to 
conserve power. 
HACC teams in the audited councils had developed heatwave vulnerability lists to 
identify clients who were at increased risk in extreme heat. During the 2014 heatwave, 
councils contacted people on this list when a heat health alert was received. However, 
councils are only aware of people who are accessing their services, which means that 
not all vulnerable people are being contacted. This highlights the need for public 
information to be widely available prior to and during a heatwave. 
In 2014, it was not until 16 January that the first print media advertisements on heat 
health were placed in newspapers. Yet by 15 January 2014, the department had 
identified through its surveillance information that heat-coded ambulance dispatch 
callouts were 11 times higher than normal and NURSE-ON-CALL heat-related calls 
were double the average.   
Figure 4E illustrates the increase in the number of the department’s Better Health 
Channel website resources viewed or downloaded as members of the public sought 
more information. 
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  Figure 4E
Comparison of website hits for Better Health Channel factsheets 
Better Health Channel 
factsheets 6–12 January 2014 13–18 January 2014 
Increase  
(per cent) 
Child safety – hot weather 405 2 170 435 
Heat stress – preventing 
heat stroke 
167 552 230 
Heat stress and heat 
related illness 
2 381 7 848 229 
Heat stress and the elderly 125 544 335 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office based on Department of Health's evaluation report 
January 2014 Heatwave Communications. 
The Better Health Channel website reported increased traffic between 
13 and18 January 2014, compared to the previous week. The biggest increase was for 
information on child safety in hot weather, which increased by 435 per cent.  
Thirty per cent of heat health calls to NURSE-ON-CALL in 2014 were related to 
children. 
However, while multi-modal forms of messaging are required, not all people vulnerable 
to heatwave have access to the internet or would understand where to find relevant 
information. Therefore, it is important for information to be broad based so that family 
and friends can support those who may be at risk—including young children, pregnant 
women and people on certain medications. Public health requires a whole of 
community response.  
There is insufficient education and public information on the impact of extreme heat to 
assist the general public in preparing for heatwaves and to build resilience within the 
community. 
Unlike Total Fire Ban alerts, and despite improved coverage in 2014, heatwave 
conditions receive minimal media coverage. Despite the higher level of estimated 
mortality from heatwaves in Victoria, there is inadequate focus on the risks associated 
with extreme heat and ways to manage these risks.  
Communities are not being given sufficient information to make informed decisions, 
including modifying their behaviour, in the heat. For example, in the 2014 heatwave, 
Ambulance Victoria reported attending 60 cases of children being locked in hot cars. 
This occurred despite the Better Health Channel website's advice never to leave 
babies or young children in a car, a similar reminder in a department media release, a 
public announcement on the ABC, and information being relayed through  
NURSE-ON-CALL. Without a public education campaign that includes advice on 
adapting to, preparing for and coping with, the impact of extreme heat, the premature 
death of Victorians during these types of emergency events is likely to continue. 
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Communication resources 
All audited health services and municipal councils reported that the department's 
communication resources contain appropriate heatwave messages but identified 
opportunities to improve how well they distribute the department’s information in their 
communities. 
Brochures and information booklets on heat stress and the elderly, young children and 
heat, preventing heat stroke, heat-related illness, and heat stress and sport can be 
downloaded from the department's Better Health Channel website.   
Figure 4F is an example of a brochure available online.   
  Figure 4F
Staying healthy in the heat 
 
Source: Department of Health's website, www.health.vic.gov.au. 
These resources provide a consistent set of messages and are readily available. One 
of the key principles of community warnings is that the community should be able to 
verify the message. However, no resources included information on how to calculate 
the heat health threshold or the importance of the heat health alert. This information is 
important for agencies and individuals who need to seek advice or check on relatives.  
A 2011 evaluation of the heatwave framework made recommendations aimed at 
improving communication resources, including: 
x consideration of the use of social media 
x targeting resources to other vulnerable groups—including children, people with a 
disability, and culturally and linguistically diverse communities  
x making the presentation of resources more visually accessible to the elderly. 
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To reduce the impact of extreme heat, more education and public information 
campaigns—including on the dangers of extreme heat for the aged and the very 
young—are needed, using a variety of multi-modal methods. 
4.4 Activation of heatwave plans 
Activation of agency heatwave plans is not consistent, monitored or reported. Because 
there are no clearly outlined expectations about what actions will be activated as an 
incident progresses, different approaches have been applied. This has resulted in an 
inconsistent understanding of what activation of a heatwave plan means. 
To determine whether the activation of heatwave plans was effective, we examined 
whether activation was monitored and whether issues were reported and addressed.  
4.4.1 Is activation consistently applied? 
Unlike other jurisdictional state-level heatwave plans, the Heatwave Plan for Victoria – 
Protecting health and reducing harm from heatwaves does not specify a phased 
approach using the prevention, preparedness, response and recovery approach, and 
lacks clear expectations of agency actions. This means that activation in 2014 was 
interpreted as anything from sending out a summer newsletter, or forwarding a heat 
health alert, to establishing an incident control centre. Audited councils that had a 
phased approach in their heatwave plans had a better understanding of activation and 
could clearly demonstrate at what phase they would move to response activities. 
The department, through regional emergency management teams, requested councils 
to confirm activation of their heatwave plan, including what strategies they had 
implemented. Not all councils responded and the responses varied. Reported 
strategies included:  
x extending swimming pool hours 
x providing water at cool places such as libraries 
x organising transport home from cool places for the elderly 
x adjusting outside play time at children services 
x shopping for clients 
x modifying Meals–on-Wheels delivery 
x implementing staff policies on working in hot weather. 
In late January a second spike in extreme heat occurred. The department surveyed 
councils on 30 January 2014. The survey did not ask councils whether they had 
activated their heatwave plans, rather, which strategies from a predetermined list of 
12 they had implemented. 
Figure 4G shows the strategies implemented by councils to manage the impact of 
heatwaves on their communities within the forecast weather districts.  
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  Figure 4G
Heatwave strategies implemented by councils within 
weather forecast district, 30 January 2014 
Strategy C NE EG NCY SW WSG M NC W Total  
Number of councils  37 7 1 6 8 4 4 4 5 76 
Promote heatwave awareness 37 7 1 6 8 4 3 4 4 74 
Disseminate heatwave materials 37 7 1 6 8 4 3 4 4 74 
Brief staff and key agencies about 
heatwave plan responsibilities   
34 7 1 6 7 4 2 4 5 70 
Encourage family and friends to 
contact vulnerable people 
32 7 1 5 6 4 3 4 4 66 
Notify service providers of 
vulnerable population groups of 
impending heatwaves 
31 7 1 5 5 3 3 4 5 64 
Increase outreach to vulnerable 
population groups  
31 5 0 3 7 2 4 4 4 60 
Promote NURSE-ON-CALL 21 7 1 4 4 4 3 4 3 51 
Identify and promote safe, cool, 
public places  
24 7 0 5 2 0 2 3 3 46 
Extend hours of air conditioned 
council buildings  
14 6 1 6 1 1 1 3 3 36 
Prompt institutions accommodating 
vulnerable populations to 
implement heatwave plans  
17 0 0 1 4 1 2 0 3 28 
Implement cancellation policy for 
outdoor sport  
17 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 21 
Establish cooling centres 5 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 8 
Note: C=Central, NE = North East, EG = East Gippsland, NCY = Northern Country, SW = South West, WSG = 
West & South Gippsland, M = Mallee, NC = North Central, W = Wimmera.  
Note:  76 out of 79 councils responded. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on Department of Health council survey responses. 
Figure 4G shows that the least implemented strategies were establishing cooling 
centres and the implementation of a cancellation policy for sport and recreation events. 
The most commonly implemented strategies were to promote heat awareness and 
disseminate heatwave awareness material. Only five of the surveyed councils did not 
implement these two strategies. 
The survey asked whether councils had notified service providers with vulnerable 
clients to activate their plans. To this question, 80 per cent of councils responded 
positively.  
It was only within the department's Hume region that all councils in the region reported 
that they had notified providers who were responsible for vulnerable population groups 
of the impending heatwave. This departmental region includes councils in multiple 
weather forecast districts, including North East, North Central and Northern Country. 
Activation and response to heatwaves 
 
44       Heatwave Management: Reducing the Risk to Public Health Victorian Auditor-General’s Report 
The wide variety of strategies used by councils highlights the need for a more 
consistent approach to the activation of heatwave plans at the municipal level. Even 
for strategies that are fundamental to an adequate response—such as promoting 
heatwave awareness, disseminating heatwave materials, briefing staff and key 
agencies about responsibilities, and notifying services providers of vulnerable 
population groups regarding the impending extreme heat—there was not active 
engagement in these strategies. 
4.4.2 Is activation monitored and reported? 
Monitoring and reporting of activation is variable. Because roles and responsibilities for 
managing the response to heatwaves are not clear, oversight of response activities is 
done through functional levels and is not part of a systematic assessment of actions. 
Health services 
In the 2014 heatwave, the department monitored the activation of heatwave plans by 
health services appropriately, although acknowledged it would not normally do this 
under the devolved governance model. Through its role as Health Command, the 
department contacted health services, advising them of the extreme heat conditions 
and asked them to confirm: 
x the key contact person 
x that they had an alternate power source and had checked its operation 
x that their heat health operation plan was in place for staff and patients 
x that they had capacity to increase staffing to meet demand. 
Heat health action plans were also completed and provided by regional office staff to 
monitor whether health, community health or aged care providers had ceased 
providing services. This level of monitoring was timely and appropriate. 
Councils 
It is not clear who is responsible for monitoring activation of council heatwave plans—
the department as the support agency for managing the impact of extreme heat on 
public health, Victoria Police as the control agency for heatwave emergencies, or 
another agency altogether.  
None of the audited councils activated their municipal emergency coordination centre. 
Councils also reported that a heatwave alone would be unlikely to activate the centre.  
The department's survey of councils in 2014 is a good initiative, but there is no clear 
guidance around which strategies have proven to be most effective with which groups 
of people. This represents a missed opportunity to collect data around better practice 
and develop a more consistent approach to heatwave plan activation at the local level.  
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4.4.3 The Heat Health Information Surveillance System 
The HHISS has contributed to a better understanding of the impact of extreme heat on 
Victorians, providing the evidence-base to further improve the state's response to 
heatwaves in a targeted and comprehensive manner at all levels of government.  
The heatwave framework aims to reduce the impact of extreme heat on public health. 
To monitor achievement of this outcome, the department developed the HHISS. 
Information from this system has been used to produce two reports on the impact of 
the 2009 and 2014 heatwaves on public health.  
The system accesses data on temperature, health service activity and mortality to 
generate a surveillance report used to assess public health risk from heat and to 
support emergency planning. HHISS reports are produced weekly from November to 
March, and daily during an extreme heat event. However, the HHISS only uses 
metropolitan data, primarily from the central weather forecast district. While HHISS 
data was assessed on a daily basis during the January 2014 heatwave, significant lags 
were experienced from some data sources, which affected the capacity of the system 
to provide real-time surveillance information.    
The HHISS is unable to confirm causality between the department’s heatwave 
framework and a reduction in mortality during the 2014 heatwave. However, as there 
was no heatwave framework in place during the 2009 heatwave, the development of 
the current framework elements should be acknowledged as important steps in the 
right direction. 
The 2011 evaluation of the heatwave framework recommended a formal evaluation of 
the HHISS. This would assist the department to identify the cost benefits of the 
continued use of the HHISS and potential opportunities for leveraging the current data.   
4.4.4 Impact on public health 
While there was a reduction in the estimated number of deaths during the 2014 
heatwave, the department is not able to clearly attribute this outcome to the 
implementation of its framework. However, in 2009 there was no heatwave framework 
in place. This means that the framework and collective efforts of all agencies have had 
an impact on the reduction in excess deaths in 2014. 
The heatwave framework includes many of the elements accepted by leading 
international health and meteorological organisations as being essential to respond to 
the significant health risks associated with heatwaves. The fact that the department 
has implemented an evidence-based approach to the management of heatwaves in 
Victoria is a sound step. 
However, further refinement of the framework—including addressing the gaps 
identified in this audit and in the 2011 heatwave evaluation—is needed in order to 
improve the state's capacity to prepare for and respond to more frequent and more 
prolonged extreme heat events in the future. 
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Recommendations 
That the Department of Health: 
6. develops a communication strategy for heatwaves that includes public awareness 
and education activities 
7. implements a phased approach to heat health alert warning categories in line with 
the Victorian Warning Protocol 
8. reviews the purpose and effectiveness of the Heat Health Information 
Surveillance System during a heatwave. 
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Appendix A. 
Audit Act 1994 section 16—
submissions and comments 
 
Introduction 
In accordance with section 16(3) of the Audit Act 1994, a copy of this report, or part of 
this report, was provided to the Department of Health, the Department of Human 
Services, the Department of Justice—which includes Emergency Management 
Victoria— Ambulance Victoria, Victoria Police and the three audited councils and three 
audited health services 
The submissions and comments provided are not subject to audit nor the evidentiary 
standards required to reach an audit conclusion. Responsibility for the accuracy, 
fairness and balance of those comments rests solely with the agency head. 
Responses were received as follows: 
Department of Health .................................................................................................. 48 
Department of Justice ................................................................................................. 50 
Ambulance Victoria ..................................................................................................... 52 
Victoria Police .............................................................................................................. 53 
Further audit comment: 
Auditor-General’s response to Victoria Police ............................................................. 54 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Health 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Health – continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Justice 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Justice – continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Chief Executive Officer, Ambulance Victoria 
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RESPONSE provided by the Chief Commissioner, Victoria Police 
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RESPONSE provided by the Chief Commissioner, Victoria Police – continued 
 
Auditor-General’s response to Victoria Police 
Victoria Police has indicated that: ‘The report appears to be critical of the focus on the 
response to bushfires during the period of the 2014 heatwave, but does not provide 
any constructive commentary on how bushfire agencies could more effectively 
integrate the heatwave response into the response for bushfires’. 
Our report does not suggest that the focus on bushfires should have been reduced—
rather it makes the point—pages ix, 17 and 18—that there should have been a 
commensurate focus on the impact of heatwaves. There was no statewide, strategic 
view of the combined impact of the different emergencies. VAGO has not examined the 
bushfire management arrangements as part of this audit. But, it is open to agencies 
responsible for the management and response to heatwaves to consider how they 
might integrate these arrangements with those already existing for bushfires, as 
Victoria Police has suggested. 
Further, Victoria Police has stated that the ‘strategic approach’ adopted by Victoria 
Police with the Department of Health ’has not been fully recognised in the report’.  
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Auditor-General’s response to Victoria Police – continued 
Our report—page 17—lists some of the strategic responsibilities of a control agency 
under the emergency management arrangements. These include managing all 
response activities, leading multi-agency response planning, and collecting, analysing 
and disseminating information regarding the emergency. Victoria Police did not 
assume these responsibilities in the 2014 heatwave. Even where Victoria Police took 
leadership actions—for example, in some regions—these were not strategic, 
systematic or sustained. The ‘strategic approach’ referred to by Victoria Police 
consisted of an informal arrangement that DH would lead the health response in a 
heatwave. However, this ‘strategic’ approach involved one agency, not all support 
agencies, and focused on health only, and not the full range of potential hazards and 
risks. 
 

Auditor-General’s reports 
Reports tabled during 2014–15 
 
Report title Date tabled 
Technical and Further Education Institutes: Results of the 2013 Audits (2014–15:1) August 2014 
Coordinating Public Transport (2014–15:2) August 2014 
Managing the Environmental Impacts of Transport (2014–15:3) August 2014 
Access to Legal Aid (2014–15:4) August 2014 
Managing Landfills (2014–15:5) September 2014 
Management and Oversight of the Caulfield Racecourse Reserve (2014–15:6) September 2014 
Effectiveness of Catchment Management Authorities (2014–15:7) September 2014 
 
VAGO’s website at www.audit.vic.gov.au contains a comprehensive list of all reports issued by VAGO.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Availability of reports 
All reports are available for download in PDF and HTML format on our website 
www.audit.vic.gov.au 
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